Tailored intelligence to detect unusual epidemic activity following the explosion at Vector, Russia

We used open source data from the EpiWATCH observatory to monitor for early disease signals in Russia and surrounding countries following an explosion at a BSL 4 laboratory, Vector, in Siberia in September 2019. Upon news of the explosion at Vector on September 16th 2019, the EpiWATCH team added the Russian language and key words Russia, Siberia, Novosibirsk, and Koltsovo to the Standard Operating Procedures, in addition to the usual epidemic-specific keywords used in EpiWATCH. We also searched for outbreak reports in countries bordering Siberia, including Mongolia, Kazakhstan and China. Given local spread of an epidemic could manifest in these countries, we included searching in Chinese, Mongolian and Kazakh. We added "Ukraine” as a key word, given current conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Data collection began in September 2019, one week after the explosion, with this considered the baseline. We demonstrate a method for rapid epidemic intelligence following an incident of concern, the explosion at Vector. There were some unexplained outbreaks in Russia in the three months following the explosion. No unexplained outbreaks were detected in countries bordering Russia, nor in Ukraine in the three months following the explosion. We detected an accidental release of brucella from a laboratory in China in early December 2019 and two reports of severe pneumonia prior to official reports, which could have been early COVID-19 cases. Best practice in preparedness should include surveillance for disease events in the months following an event of concern at local, national and global levels. In the absence of official surveillance data, open source intelligence may be the only available means of detecting outbreaks and enabling early response and mitigation for the rest of the world. EpiWATCH was able to identify reports of Russian outbreaks in the weeks and months following the Vector explosion, which allowed monitoring of outbreaks of concern without a known cause. © 2020 The Author(s).

Significance of High-Containment Biological Laboratories Performing Work During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Biosafety Level-3 and -4 Labs.

High containment biological laboratories (HCBL) are required for work on Risk Group 3 and 4 agents across the spectrum of basic, applied, and translational research. These laboratories include biosafety level (BSL)-3, BSL-4, animal BSL (ABSL)-3, BSL-3-Ag (agriculture livestock), and ABSL-4 laboratories. While SARS-CoV-2 is classified as a Risk Group 3 biological agent, routine diagnostic can be handled at BSL-2. Scenarios involving virus culture, potential exposure to aerosols, divergent high transmissible variants, and zoonosis from laboratory animals require higher BSL-3 measures. Establishing HCBLs especially those at BSL-4 is costly and needs continual investments of resources and funding to sustain labor, equipment, infrastructure, certifications, and operational needs. There are now over 50 BSL-4 laboratories and numerous BSL-3 laboratories worldwide. Besides technical and funding challenges, there are biosecurity and dual-use risks, and local community issues to contend with in order to sustain operations. Here, we describe case histories for distinct HCBLs: representative national centers for diagnostic and reference, nonprofit organizations. Case histories describe capabilities and assess activities during COVID-19 and include capacities, gaps, successes, and summary of lessons learned for future practice.

The East African Community (EAC) mobile laboratory networks in Kenya, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and South Sudan-from project implementation to outbreak response against Dengue, Ebola, COVID-19, and epidemic-prone diseases.

BACKGROUND: East Africa is home to 170 million people and prone to frequent outbreaks of viral haemorrhagic fevers and various bacterial diseases. A major challenge is that epidemics mostly happen in remote areas, where infrastructure for Biosecurity Level (BSL) 3/4 laboratory capacity is not available. As samples have to be transported from the outbreak area to the National Public Health Laboratories (NPHL) in the capitals or even flown to international reference centres, diagnosis is significantly delayed and epidemics emerge. MAIN TEXT: The East African Community (EAC), an intergovernmental body of Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan, received 10 million € funding from the German Development Bank (KfW) to establish BSL3/4 capacity in the region. Between 2017 and 2020, the EAC in collaboration with the Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine (Germany) and the Partner Countries' Ministries of Health and their respective NPHLs, established a regional network of nine mobile BSL3/4 laboratories. These rapidly deployable laboratories allowed the region to reduce sample turn-around-time (from days to an average of 8h) at the centre of the outbreak and rapidly respond to epidemics. In the present article, the approach for implementing such a regional project is outlined and five major aspects (including recommendations) are described: (i) the overall project coordination activities through the EAC Secretariat and the Partner States, (ii) procurement of equipment, (iii) the established laboratory setup and diagnostic panels, (iv) regional training activities and capacity building of various stakeholders and (v) completed and ongoing field missions. The latter includes an EAC/WHO field simulation exercise that was conducted on the border between Tanzania and Kenya in June 2019, the support in molecular diagnosis during the Tanzanian Dengue outbreak in 2019, the participation in the Ugandan National Ebola response activities in Kisoro district along the Uganda/DRC border in Oct/Nov 2019 and the deployments of the laboratories to assist in SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics throughout the region since early 2020. CONCLUSIONS: The established EAC mobile laboratory network allows accurate and timely diagnosis of BSL3/4 pathogens in all East African countries, important for individual patient management and to effectively contain the spread of epidemic-prone diseases.

Commentary: mobile laboratories for SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics: what Europe could learn from the East African Community to assure trade in times of border closures.

BACKGROUND: The emergence of SARS-CoV-2 mutants might lead to European border closures, which impact on trade and result in serious economic losses. In April 2020, similar border closures were observed during the first SARS-CoV-2 wave in East Africa. MAIN BODY: Since 2017 the East African Community EAC together with the Bernhard-Nocht-Institute for Tropical Medicine BNITM established a mobile laboratory network integrated into the National Public Health Laboratories of the six Partner States for molecular diagnosis of viral haemorrhagic fevers and SARS-CoV-2. Since May 2020, the National Public Health Laboratories of Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and South Sudan deployed these mobile laboratories to their respective borders, issuing a newly developed "Electronic EAC COVID-19 Digital Certificate" to SARS-CoV-2 PCR-negative truck drivers, thus assuring regional trade. CONCLUSION: Considering the large financial damages of border closures, such a mobile laboratory network as demonstrated in East Africa is cost-effective, easy to implement and feasible. The East African Community mobile laboratory network could serve as a blueprint for Europe and other countries around the globe.

Elucidation of cellular targets and exploitation of the receptor-binding domain of SARS-CoV-2 for vaccine and monoclonal antibody synthesis.

The pandemic caused by novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) has resulted in over 452 822 deaths in the first 20 days of June 2020 due to the coronavirus virus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The SARS-CoV-2 uses the host angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor to gain entry inside the human cells where it replicates by using the cell protein synthesis mechanisms. The knowledge of the tissue distribution of ACE2 in human organs is therefore important to predict the clinical course of the COVID-19. Also important is the understanding of the viral receptor-binding domain (RBD), a region within the spike (S) proteins, that enables the entry of the virus into the host cells to synthesize vaccine and monoclonal antibodies (mAbs). We performed an exhaustive search of human protein databases to establish the tissues that express ACE2 and performed an in-depth analysis like sequence alignments and homology modeling of the spike protein (S) of the SARS-CoV-2 to identify antigenic regions in the RBD that can be exploited to synthesize vaccine and mAbs. Our results show that ACE2 is widely expressed in human organs that may explain the pulmonary, systemic, and neurological deficits seen in COVID-19 patients. We show that though the S protein of the SARS-CoV-2 is a homolog of S protein of SARS-CoV-1, it has regions of dissimilarities in the RBD and transmembrane segments. We show peptide sequences in the RBD of SARS-CoV-2 that can bind to the major histocompatibility complex alleles and serve as effective epitopes for vaccine and mAbs synthesis.

In the Shadow of Biological Warfare: Conspiracy Theories on the Origins of COVID-19 and Enhancing Global Governance of Biosafety as a Matter of Urgency.

Two theories on the origins of COVID-19 have been widely circulating in China and the West respectively, one blaming the United States and the other a highest-level biocontainment laboratory in Wuhan, the initial epicentre of the pandemic. Both theories make claims of biological warfare attempts. According to the available scientific evidence, these claims are groundless. However, like the episodes of biological warfare during the mid-twentieth century, the spread of these present-day conspiracy theories reflects a series of longstanding and damaging trends in the international scene which include deep mistrust, animosities, the power of ideologies such as nationalism, and the sacrifice of truth in propaganda campaigns. Also, the threats associated with biological warfare, bioterrorism, and the accidental leakage of deadly viruses from labs are real and growing. Thus, developing a better global governance of biosafety and biosecurity than exists at present is an urgent imperative for the international community in the broader context of a looming Cold War II. For such a governance, an ethical framework is proposed based upon the triple ethical values of transparency, trust, and the common good of humanity.